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41-6-45 MOTOR VEHICLES 
41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty. 
(1) A person who operates any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the 
safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving. 
(2) A person convicted of reckless driving is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor. Upon a first conviction, the penalty is a minimum term of imprison-
ment of not fewer than five days, or a minimum fine of not less than $25. On a 
second or subsequent conviction, the penalty is a minimum term of imprison-
ment of not fewer than ten days, or a minimum fine of not less than $50. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 35; C. 1943, 
57-7-112; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 9; 1986, ch. 178, 
§ 30; 1987, ch. 138, § 44; 1987, ch. 204, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amend-
ment rewrote Subsection (2). 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 138, sub-
stituted "A person who operates" for "Any per-
son who drives" in Subsection (1) and made 
minor changes in phraseology in the second 
and third sentences of Subsection (2). 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 204, made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. - Penalty for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-30L 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Former jeopardy. 
Conviction of motorist for reckless driving 
held not bar to subsequent prosecution for in-
voluntary manslaughter. State v. Empey, 65 
Utah 609, 239 P. 25, 44 A.L.R. 558 (1925), re-
viewed, State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 
P.2d 258 (1945). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 312 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles§§ 609 
to 624. 
A.L.R. - Validity, construction, and appli-
cation of criminal statutes specifically directed 
against racing of automobiles on public streets 
or highways (drag racing), 24 A.L.R.3d 1286. 
Liability of one fleeing police for injury re-
sulting from collision of police vehicle with an-
other vehicle, person, or object, 51 A.L.R.3d 
1226. 
Statute prohibiting reckless driving: defi-
niteness and certainty, 52 A.L.R.4th 1161. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ~ 330. 
ARTICLE 6 
SPEED RESTRICTIONS 
41-6-46. Speed regulations- Safe and appropriate speeds 
at certain locations - Prima facie speed limits -
Emergency power of the governor. 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable 
and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and poten-
tial hazards then existing, including, but not limited to when: 
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing; 
(b) approaching and going around a curve; 
(c) approaching a hill crest; 
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and 
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(e) special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or 
by reason of weather or highway conditions. 
(2) Where no special hazard exists, and subject to Subsection (3) and Sec-
tions 41-6-47 and 41-6-48, the following speeds are lawful. Any speed in excess 
of these limits is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or 
prudent and that it is unlawful: 
(a) twenty miles per hour when passing a school building or its grounds 
during school recess or while children are going to or leaving school dur-
ing opening or closing hours, except that local authorities may require a 
complete stop before passing a school building or grounds at any of these 
periods; 
(b) twenty-five miles per hour in any urban district; and 
(c) fifty-five miles per hour in other locations. 
(3) The Governor by proclamation in time of war or emergency may change 
the speed limits on the highways of the state. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-46, enacted by L. 
1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 1; 1987, ch. 138, § 45; 
1987 (1st S.S.), ch. I, § 1. 
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1978 
(2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 1 repealed former § 41-6-46 
(L. 1941, ch. 52, § 36; C. 1943, 57-7-113; L. 
1951, ch. 72, § 1; 1957, ch. 76, § l; 1959, ch. 
66, § l; 1978, ch. 34, § 1), relating to speed 
regulations, and enacted present § 41-6-46. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (1) in the opening clause 
substituted "operate" for "drive," designated 
the previously undesignated second sentence of 
this subsection, substituted "including, but not 
limited to when" for "Consistent with the fore-
going, every person shall drive at a safe and 
appropriate speed when," in Subsection (2) in-
serted "and subject to Subsection (3) and 
§§ 41-6-47 and 41-6-48" following "special haz-
ard exists," deleted the former undesignated 
last sentence of Subsection (2) and made minor 
changes in phraseolgy and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
The 1987 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective 
May 20, 1987, in Subsection (1), inserted "ex-
isting" and substituted "giving" for "having" in 
the introductory paragraph and substituted 
"regarding" for "with respect to" and "due to" 
for "by reason of' in Subsection (e); and, in 
Subsection (2), substituted "during" for "at" 
near the end of Subsection (a), inserted present 
Subsection (c), and redesignated former Sub-
section (c) as present Subsection (d). 
Legislative Intent. - Laws 1987 (1st S.S.), 
ch. 1, § 2 states the legislative intent that all 
sections of the Utah highway which qualify un-
der § 41-6-46(2)(c) for the 65 miles per hour 
speed limit be posted at 65, subject to the provi-
sions of§§ 41-6-47 and 41-6-48 regarding rea-
sonable and safe speed limits. 
Cross-References. - Municipal regula-
tions, § 10-8-30. 
Reckless driving, § 41-6-45. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Construction and application. 
Former jeopardy. 
Instructions. 
Motor carriers and buses. 
National emergency. 
Negligence. 
Pleadings and proceedings. 
Questions of law and fact. 
Constitutionality. 
A former speed law was held constitutional 
as against contention that it violated Utah con-
stitutional provision, providing that no bill 
shall be passed containing more than one sub-
ject, which shall be clearly expressed in its ti-
tle. State v. Brown, 75 Utah 37, 282 P. 785 
(1928). 
This section is not unconstitutionally vague. 
State v. Pilcher, 636 P.2d 470 (Utah 1981). 
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Construction and application. 
This section requires that driver shall not 
drive at speed greater than is reasonable and 
prudent in view of existing conditions and haz-
ards on highway, that his speed shall be con-
trolled so as to avoid colliding with other vehi-
cle~ entering or upon highway in lawful man-
ner, and that speed shall be appropriately re-
duced when special hazards exist with respect 
to other traffic or by reason of weather condi-
tions. Horsley v. Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 
P.2d 592 (1947). 
Former jeopardy. 
Conviction of motorist charged with speed-
ing under this section does not bar subsequent 
prosecution for involuntary manslaughter. 
State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258 
(1945). 
Instructions. 
In action arising out of car-pedestrian acci-
dent in California, evidence did not justify in-
struction that defendant had duty to drive car 
in conformity with California statute providing 
that no person shall drive vehicle at speed 
greater than is reasonable and prudent, where 
there was no evidence that defendant's speed of 
20 to 25 miles per hour was excessive or unrea-
sonable. (Deering's Cal. Vehicle Code § 510.) 
Hunter v. Michaelis, 114 Utah 242, 198 P.2d 
245 (1948). 
Where defendant failed to see small child in 
the street until it was too late to avoid striking 
him, the trial court should have instructed jury 
that driver is charged with duty of seeing what 
he would have seen had he been exercising rea-
sonable care, since evidence showed motorist 
should have seen the child much sooner; in-
structing jury on right to assume others will 
perform their legal duties and on sudden or 
unexpected situation arising without fault on 
defendant's part was reversible error. Solt v. 
Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d 474 (1971). 
Motor carriers and buses. 
Driver of vehicle carrying passengers for 
hire owes them duty to operate vehicle within 
such rate of speed as reasonably prudent per-
son would operate under existing conditions, 
and, where road and weather conditions make 
driving hazardous, reasonable prudence re-
quires proportionate increase in care of driver 
to avoid injury to passengers. Horsley v. Robin-
son, 112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592 (1947). 
Where bus, while traveling between 20 and 
50 miles per hour under very hazardous condi-
tions on outside lane on main highway which 
was covered with ice and slush, collided with 
automobile approaching from opposite direc-
tion which went out of control and skidded into 
path of bus, and distance between bus and au-
tomobile, when it first became discernible that 
latter was out of control, was between 30 and 
330 feet, evidence was sufficient to sustain ver-
dict in favor of injured bus passenger for hire 
as against bus company, in that jury could con-
clude therefrom that bus driver was neligent in 
operating bus at excessive rate of speed under 
such circumstances, which was proximate 
cause of collision. Horsley v. Robinson, 112 
Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592 (1947). 
National emergency. 
"National emergency" as used in former pro-
vision authorizing governor to change speed 
limit by proclamation meant an unforeseen 
combination of circumstances calling for imme-
diate action by national leaders and support 
from citizens for the safety, peace, health and 
general welfare of the nation; the 1973 Arab 
oil embargo was such an emergency and gover-
nor could validly reduce state-wide speed limit 
to 55 miles per hour by proclamation. State v. 
Foukas, 560 P.2d 312 (Utah 1977). 
Validly issued proclamation by governor set-
ting speed limit could be terminated by gover-
nor's proclamation, by legislative action, or by 
judicial holding that the circumstances had so 
changed that the proclamation could no longer 
serve any useful purpose; governor's proclama-
tion limiting speed limit to 55 miles per hour 
had not been terminated as of December 2, 
1976. In re Prisbrey, 576 P.2d 1278 (Utah 
1978). 
Negligence. 
Ordinarily it is not negligence to operate a 
motor vehicle within the speed limit prescribed 
by statute or ordinance, although a jury may 
say in some instances, dependent upon the par-
ticular attendant facts and circumstances, that 
the operation of an automobile within pre-
scribed limit is nevertheless negligence. 
Lochhead v. Jensen, 42 Utah 99, 129 P. 347 
(1912). 
Violation of speed regulations may consti-
tute negligence per se. Jensen v. Utah Light & 
Ry., 42 Utah 415, 132 P. 8 (1913). 
Operating a motor vehicle at less than the 
lawful maximum speed may constitute negli-
gence under given circumstances. Fowkes v. 
J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 46 Utah 502, 
151 P. 53 (1915). 
It has long been the rule in this state that it 
is negligence as a matter of law to drive an 
automobile upon a traveled public highway at 
such rate of speed that said automobile cannot 
be stopped within distance at which operator of 
said car is able to see objects upon highway in 
front of him. Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy 
Prods. Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P.2d 309 (1932). 
When a driver upon a public highway with 
his light equipment cannot see more than 50 
feet ahead of him, it is his duty to drive at such 
speed as will enable him to stop within that 
distance. Hansen v. Clyde, 89 Utah 31, 56 P.2d 
1366, 104 A.L.R. 943 (1936). 
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For general discussion as to speed and civil 
liability with respect thereto, see opinions by 
Wade, Wolfe and Pratt, JJ., in Horsley v. Rob-
inson, 112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592 (1947). 
Where fog was so great that visibility was 
limited to 20 or 25 feet and a safe speed under 
those conditions was about five miles per hour, 
the court cannot say as a matter of law that the 
plaintiff was not negligent in operating his car 
at the rate of 25 miles per hour. Shields v. 
Ramon, 122 Utah 474, 251 P.2d 671 (1952). 
Driving in excess of speed limit may consti-
tute prima facie evidence of negligence, but 
does not constitute conclusive evidence. 
Cardon v. Brenchley, 575 P.2d 184 (Utah 
1978). 
Pleadings and proceedings. 
If the complaint is fatally defective in its al-
legations when viewed as an attempt to bring 
defendant within the provisions of this section, 
judgment for plaintiff will be reversed. Wood-
ward v. Spring Canyon Coal Co., 90 Utah 578, 
63 P.2d 267 (1936). 
Questions of law and fact. 
Whether the speed at which the vehicle was 
going at the time was the proximate cause of 
the accident is a question of fact. Sweet v. Salt 
Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913). 
In action arising out of intersection collision, 
evidence sufficiently established prima facie 
case of negligence on part of defendant in fail-
ing to yield right-of-way and in traveling at 
excessive rate of speed, and contributory negli-
gence on part of plaintiff in failing to keep 
proper lookout and in traveling at excessive 
rate of speed was for jury. Martin v. Sheffield, 
112 Utah 478, 189 P.2d 127 (1948). 
What is a reasonable and prudent speed un-
der the conditions and having regard to the 
actual and potential hazards then existing is a 
matter about which there is room for reason-
able disagreement and such being the case, a 
jury question is presented. Lodder v. Western 
Pac. R.R., 123 Utah 316, 259 P.2d 589 (1953). 
In action against motorist for death of dece-
dent, who was killed while hitching small trac-
tor to rear of an automobile, it was a question 
of fact for the jury whether motorist was negli-
gent in failing to reduce her speed below 50 
miles per hour when she saw wrecker ahead of 
her on the highway. Taylor v. Johnson, 15 
Utah 2d 342, 393 P.2d 382 (1964). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic, § 218 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 641 
to 650. 
A.L.R. - Indefiniteness of automobile speed 
regulations as affecting validity, 6 A.L.R.3d 
1326. 
Speeding prosecution based on observation 
from aircraft, 23 A.L.R.3d 1446. 
Validity, construction, and application of 
criminal statutes specifically directed against 
racing of automobiles on public streets or high-
way (drag racing), 24 A.L.R.3d 1286. 
Opinion testimony as to speed of motor vehi-
cle based on skid marks and other facts, 29 
A.L.R.3d 248. 
Competency of nonexpert's testimony based 
on sound alone as to speed of motor vehicle 
involved in accident, 33 A.L.R.3d 1405. 
Proof, by radar or other mechanical or elec-
tronic devices, of violation of speed regulations, 
47 A.L.R.3d 822. 
Liability of public authority for injury aris-
ing out of automobile race conducted on street 
or highway, 80 A.L.R.3d 1192. 
Key Numbers. - Automobile """ 331. 
41-6-47. Prima facie speed limit. 
(1) (a) When the Department of Transportation determines upon the basis 
of an engineering and traffic investigation that any prima facie speed 
under this article is not reasonable or safe under the existing conditions 
at any intersection or other place or on a state highway, the Department 
of Transportation may determine a reasonable and safe prima facie speed 
limit. 
(b) When changing a speed limit, the Department of Transportation 
shall consult with local political units prior to erecting or changing any 
signs within local political boundaries. 
(2) The speed limit is effective when appropriate signs giving notice are 
erected at the intersection or other place or part of the highway. 
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History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 37; C. 1943, 
57-7-114; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1979, ch. 242, 
§ 13; 1987, ch. 138, § 46; 1988, ch. 167, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation throughout the section. 
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 
1988, inserted the subsection designation (l)(a) 
at the beginning of the section; added Subsec-
tion (l)(b); inserted subsection designation (2); 
and made minor stylistic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
State-wide speed reduction. 
State road commission had no authority un-
der this section to pass ordinance reducing 
state-wide speed limit to 55 miles per hour in 
response to President's request without engi-
neering or traffic investigation or finding that 
prior limit was unreasonable or unsafe. State 
v. Foukas, 560 P.2d 312 (Utah 1977). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 218 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 641 
to 650. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ¢=> 331. 
41-6-48. Speed restrictions - Powers of local authorities 
- Posted speed. 
(1) When local authorities in their respective jurisdictions determine on the 
basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that the prima facie speed 
permitted under this article is not reasonable and safe under the conditions 
found to exist upon a highway or part of a highway, the local authority may 
determine a reasonable and safe prima facie limit which: 
(a) decreases the limit at intersections; 
(b) increases the limit within an urban district; or 
(c) decreases the limit outside an urban district, but not to less than 35 
miles per hour. 
(2) Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions shall determine by an 
engineering and traffic investigation the prima facie speed for all highways 
under their respective jurisdictions and shall declare a reasonable and safe 
prima facie limit, which may be different than the prima facie speed permit-
ted under this chapter for an urban district. 
(3) Any limit altered under this section is effective when appropriate signs 
giving notice are erected upon the highway. 
(4) The Department of Transportation determines prima facie evidence of a 
lawful speed on state highways whether the highways are within or without 
the corporate limits of any city. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-48, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 207, § 13; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 10; 
1987, ch. 138, § 47. 
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1975, 
ch. 207, § 14 repealed former § 41-6-48 (L. 
1941, ch. 52, § 38; C. 1943, 57-7-115; L. 1949, 
ch. 65, § 1; 1951 (1st S.S.), ch. 12, § l; 1957, 
ch. 77, § l; 1973, ch. 81, § 3), relating to speed 
restrictions and powers of local authorities, 
and enacted present § 41-6-48. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
. ment in Subsection (2) substituted "highways 
under their respective jurisdictions" for "arte· 
rial streets," in Subsection (3) substituted "the 
highway" for "such street or highway" and 
made minor changes in phraseology and punc-
tuation throughout the section. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
41-6-50 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 219. 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S Motor Vehicles § 290. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <P 168(1). 
41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations. 
(1) A person may not operate a motor vehicle at a speed so slow as to 
impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of traffic except when: 
(a) reduced speed is necessary for safe operation; 
(b) upon a grade; or 
(c) in compliance with official traffic control devices. 
(2) Operating a motor vehicle on a controlled access highway at less than 
the lawful maximum speed side by side with and at the same speed as a 
vehicle operated in the adjacent right lane constitutes evidence of impeding or 
blocking normal movement of traffic. 
(3) When the Department of Transportation or local authorities within 
their respective jurisdictions determine on the basis of an engineering and 
traffic investigation that slow speeds on any part of a highway consistently 
impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, the Department of 
Transportation or local authority may determine and shall post a minimum 
speed limit below which no person may operate a vehicle except when neces-
sary for safe operation. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 39; C. 1943, 
57-7-116; L. 1955, ch. 71, § l; 1967, ch. 89, 
§ l; 1969, ch. 108, § l; 1979, ch. 242, § 14; 
1983, ch. 337, § 2; 1987, ch. 138, § 48. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (1) substituted "operate" 
for "drive," deleted the former Subsection (c) 
which read "reduced speed is necessary be-
cause of adverse weather conditions," deleted 
Subsection (e) which read "preparing to turn 
left or enter a left lane exit ramp" and redesig-
nated the remaining subsections; in Subsection 
(3) substituted "operate" for "drive"; deleted 
the former Subsection (4) which read "A viola-
tion of this section is a class B misdemeanor"; 
and made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation throughout the section. 
Cross-References. - Slow-moving vehicle, 
§ 41-6-138. 
"Utah Horseless Carriage" exempt, 
§ 41-21-3. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 228. 
C.J.S. - 61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 588. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <P 324. 
41-6-50. Special speed limit Qn bridges - Prima facie evi-
dence. 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle over any bridge or other elevated 
structure which is a part of a highway at a speed which is greater than the 
maximum speed which may be maintained with safety on the bridge or struc-
ture, when the structure is signposted under this section. 
(2) The Department of Transportation upon request from any local author-
ity shall, or upon its own initiative, may conduct an investigation of any 
bridge or other elevated structure which is a part of a highway. If it finds the 
structure may not with safety withstand vehicles traveling at the speed other-
wise permissible under this chapter, the Department of Transportation shall 
determine the maximum speed of vehicles which the structure can withstand, 
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and shall cause or permit suitable signs stating the maximum speed to be 
erected and maintained before each end of the structure. 
(3) Upon the trial of a person charged with a violation of this section, proof 
of the determination of the maximum speed by the Department of Transporta-
tion and the existence of the signs constitute conclusive evidence of the maxi-
mum speed which may be maintained with safety on the bridge or structure. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 40; C. 1943, 
57-7-117; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 11; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 49. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation throughout the section. 
41-6-51. Speed contest or exhibition on highway - Barri-
cade or obstruction. 
(1) A person may not engage in any motor vehicle speed contest or exhibi-
tion of speed on a highway or aid or abet in any motor vehicle speed contest or 
exhibition on any highway. 
(2) A person may not, for the purpose of facilitating or aiding or as an 
incident to any motor vehicle speed contest upon a highway, in any manner 
obstruct or place any barricade or obstruction or assist or participate in plac-
ing any barricade or obstruction upon any highway. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-118.10, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1987, ch. 138, § 50. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment redesignated the provisions of this sec• 
tion and made minor changes in phraseology 
and punctuation throughout the section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Evidence of negligence. 
Racing motor vehicles on public streets and 
highways in violation of this section consti• 
tutes prima facie evidence of negligence. Little 
America Ref. Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112 (Utah 
1982). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 323. 
C.J.S. - 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles 
§ 641(1). 
A.L.R. - Validity, construction, and appli-
cation of criminal statutes, specifically directed 
against racing of automobiles on public streets 
or highways (drag racing), 24 A.L.R.3d 1286. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <t=> 6. 
41-6-52. Speed violation - Complaint - Civil negligence. 
(1) In every charge of violation of any speed provision of this article, the 
complaint and the summons or notice to appear shall specify the speed at 
which the defendant is alleged to have operated a vehicle, also the prima facie 
speed applicable within the district or at the location. 
(2) The provisions of this article declaring prima facie speed limitations do 
not relieve the plaintiff in any civil action from the burden of proving negli-
gence on the part of the defendant as the proximate cause of an accident. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 42; C. 1943, 
57-7-119; 1987, ch. 138, § 51. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment redesignated the provisions of this sec-
tion, in Subsection (1) substituted "provision of 
this article" for "regulation in this act" and 
substituted "operated a vehicle" for "driven," 
in Subsection (2) substituted "article" for "act," 
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and made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation throughout the section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 231. 
41-6-52.1. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Section 41-6-52.1 (L. 1957, ch. 
77, § 2), relating to resume speed road signs, 
was repealed by Laws 1975, ch. 207, § 61. 
C.J.S. - 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 588. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <P 351. 
ARTICLE 7 
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO DRIVING ON 
RIGHT SIDE OF HIGHWAY, OVERTAKING, 
PASSING AND OTHER RULES OF 
THE ROAD 
41-6-53. Duty to operate vehicle on right side of roadway 
- Exceptions. 
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be operated upon the 
right half of the roadway, except: 
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction under the rules governing that movement; 
(b) when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the 
center of the roadway, but the operator shall yield the right-of-way to all 
vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portions 
of the highway within a distance constituting an immediate hazard; 
(c) on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the 
applicable rules; or 
(d) on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic. 
(2) On all roadways a vehicle proceeding at less than the normal speed of 
traffic under the existing conditions shall be operated in the right-hand lane 
then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or 
edge of the roadway, except when overtaking and passing another vehicle 
proceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a left turn at an 
intersection or into a private road or driveway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 43; C. 1943, 
57-7-120; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 14; 1987, ch. 138, § 52. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment redesignated the provisions of this sec-
tion, substituted "operated" for "driven" in 
Subsections (1) and (2), and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Backing. 
Bicycle and truck. 
Effect of passing from right to center. 




Questions for jury. 
Violation as evidence of negligence. 
Backing. 
Statutes requmng that vehicles keep to 
right have no applicability to backing. Naisbitt 
v. Eggett, 5 Utah 2d 5, 295 P.2d 832 (1956). 
Bicycle and truck. 
The driver of a truck who was on right side 
of street and was not on, near to, or approach-
ing a crossing where both vehicles and pedes-
trians might pass either or both ways, had the 
right to relax his vigilance and was not re-
quired to do more than to maintain such look-
out as would prevent his colliding or coming in 
contact with anyone on his side of street. Rich-
ards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 186 
P. 439 (1919). 
Effect of passing from right to center. 
While in case a street or highway is not used 
by others one may drive on any part thereof, 
yet, when a motorist or bicyclist passes from 
right to left of the center of the street, he loses 
some of his rights, and he may not be heard to 
complain of the conduct of those who are on the 
proper side of street to the same extent as 
though he also were on the proper side. Rich-
ards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 186 
P. 439 (1919). 
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries 
sustained as result of collision with automobile 
at intersection, instruction that motorist had 
right to presume that every other person would 
obey law by traveling on right-hand side of 
road, and that no duty rested upon motorist to 
stop or change course of automobile until he 
had reason to believe that plaintiff was travel-
ing on wrong side of street, was properly re-
fused where it was disputed question as to 
whether bicyclist was on wrong side of road-
way. Cheney v. Buck, 56 Utah 29, 189 P. 81 
(1920). 
"Half of the roadway" construed. 
Where this section refers to "half of the road-
way," the reasonable interpretation of the 
meaning of this term is that it means half of 
the roadway as it exists at the time it is being 
traveled and not half of the roadway as it may 
have been laid out originally. Patton v. Kirk-
man, 109 Utah 487, 167 P.2d 282 (1946). 
Instructions. 
Where collision takes place upon street hav-
ing four traffic lanes, it is proper to instruct as 
to duty of defendant to use right traffic lane, 
and as to duty of the respective parties to use 
lane 4 rather than lane 3, where the evidence 
warrants such instruction. Thomas v. Sadleir, 
108 Utah 552, 162 P.2d 112 (1945). 
Negligence. 
The strongest kind of presumption of negli-
gence prevails against party driving on wrong 
side of road. Staton v. Western Macaroni Mfg. 
Co., 52 Utah 426, 174 P. 821 (1918). 
Presumptions. 
Where one who is operating his vehicle on 
right side of street makes survey of condition of 
street ahead of him, and in doing so he ob-
serves no one coming on his side of street, but 
sees one or more coming towards him on oppo-
site side of street, he has right to assume that 
such person will continue onward on opposite 
side of street, and not encroach upon his side. 
Richards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 
186 P. 439 (1919). 
Questions for jury. 
In action by bicyclist for personal mJunes 
sustained as result of collision with automobile 
at intersection, whether bicyclist was on right 
side of traveled road held for jury. Cheney v. 
Buck, 56 Utah 29, 189 P. 81 (1920). 
In personal-injury action arising out of auto-
mobile-truck collision on highway, ultimate 
question of fact as to which of two drivers 
failed to keep his vehicle upon proper side of 
road was for jury. Moser v. Zion's Co-op. Mer-
cantile Inst., 114 Utah 58, 197 P.2d 136 (1948). 
Violation as evidence of negligence. 
Violations of standards of safety set by stat-
ute are regarded as prima facie evidence of 
negligence subject only to justification or ex-
cuse. Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254 
(D. Utah 1968). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
41-6-55 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 260 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 268. 
A.L.R. - Automobiles: liability for U-turn 
collisions, 53 A.L.R.4th 849. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ®'> 153. 
41-6-54. Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite direc-
tions. 
Operators of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other 
to the right. On roadways having width for not more than one line of traffic in 
each direction, each operator shall give to the other at least one-half of the 
main traveled portion of the roadway as nearly as possible. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 44; C. 1943, 
57-7-121; 1987, ch. 138, § 53. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operator" for "driver" both 
places it appears and made a minor change in 
phraseology and punctuation. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
"Half of roadway" construed. 
Where this section refers to half of the road-
way, it means half of the roadway as it exists 
at the time it is being traveled, and not half of 
the roadway as it may have been laid out origi-
nally. Patton v. Kirkman, 109 Utah 487, 167 
P.2d 282 (1946). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 265, § 839 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 306. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ®'> 170(2). 
41-6-55. Overtaking and passing vehicles proceeding in 
same direction. 
The overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding in the same direction is 
subject to the following provisions: 
(1) The operator of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in 
the same direction shall pass to the left at a safe distance and may not 
again drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of the 
overtaken vehicle. 
(2) The operator of an overtaken vehicle shall give way to the right in 
favor of the overtaking vehicle and may not increase the speed of his 
vehicle until completely passed by the overtaking vehicle. 
(3) On a highway having more than one lane in the same direction, the 
operator of a vehicle traveling in a left lane shall, upon being overtaken 
by another vehicle in the same lane, yield to the over-taking vehicle by 
moving safely to the right, and may not impede the movement or free flow 
of traffic in a left lane except: 
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction; 
(b) when preparing to turn left; 
(c) when reasonably necessary in response to emergency condi-
tions; 
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(d) to avoid actual or potential traffic moving onto the right lane 
from an acceleration or merging lane; or 
(e) when necessary to follow direction signs that direct use of a 
lane other than the right lane. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 45; C. 1943, 
57-7-122; L. 1983, ch. 337, § 3; 1985, ch. 194, 
§ l; 1987, ch. 138, § 54. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amend-
ment substituted "the following provisions" for 
"those limitations, exceptions, and special 
rules hereinafter stated" in the introductory 
paragraph; deleted "thereof' after "to the left" 
in Subsection (1); substituted "may" for "shall" 
once each in Subsections (1), (2), and (3); de-
leted "on audible signal or visible headlight 
, signal" after "overtaking vehicle" in Subsec-
tion (2); deleted "who gives audible signal or 
visible headlight signal" after "same lane" in 
Subsection (3); and made minor changes in 
phraseology. 
The 1987 amendment substituted "operator" 
for "driver" throughout the section, in Subsec-
tion (3) substituted "highway" for "road," de-
leted the former Subsection (4) which read "Vi-
olation of this section is a class B misde-
meanor" and made minor changes in phraseol-
ogy and punctuation throughout the section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Degree of care. 
-Failure to exercise. 
Duty to sound horn. 
Question of fact. 
Violation as evidence of negligence. 
Degree of care. 
The rule, whether statutory or decisional, 
which requires driver of vehicle overtaking an-
other proceeding in same direction to pass to 
the left at a safe distance, imposes a high de-
gree of care commensurate with the circum-
stances involved. The driver attempts to pass 
at his peril, and the situation facing him must 
be such as to reasonably assure an ordinarily 
prudent driver that the passing can be accom-
plished with safety to all occupants of the road. 
Maragakis v. United States, 172 F.2d 393 
(10th Cir. 1949). 
-Failure to exercise. 
In action under Federal Tort Claims Act, evi-
dence disclosed that driver of government vehi-
cle failed to exercise due care in placing him-
self in position of peril by attempting to pass to 
the left of plaintiffs' vehicle. Maragakis v. 
United States, 172 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1949). 
Duty to sound horn. 
Instruction that driver of automobile had no 
duty to sound horn upon attempting to pass 
another vehicle was objectionable on basis that 
while there is no general duty to sound his 
horn, driver does have duty to give audible 
warning of approach and intention to pass 
where it would appear from all circumstances 
that such warning is reasonably necessary to 
ensure safe operation. Barton v. Jensen, 19 
Utah 2d 196, 429 P.2d 44 (1967). 
Question of fact. 
Whether defendant violated this section by 
passing on wrong side of road and failing to 
sound his horn is question of fact ordinarily. 
Fowkes v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 46 
Utah 502, 151 P. 53 (1915). 
Violation as evidence of negligence. 
Violation of standards of safety set by stat-
ute are regarded as prima facie evidence of 
negligence subject only to justification or ex-
cuse. Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254 
(D. Utah 1968), affd, 409 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 
1969). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic §§ 262 to 265. 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 326. 
A.L.R. - Giving audible signal where 
driver's view ahead is obstructed at curve or 
hill, duty and liability with respect to, 16 
A.L.R.3d 897. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles e,, 172(2). 
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41-6-56. Passing upon right - When permissible. 
(1) The operator of a vehicle may overtake and pass upon the right of 
another vehicle only: 
(a) when the vehicle overtaken is making or preparing to make a left 
turn; 
(b) upon a roadway with unobstructed pavement of sufficient width for 
two or more lines of vehicles moving lawfully in the direction being trav-
eled by the overtaking vehicle; or 
(c) upon a one-way highway, or upon any roadway on which traffic is 
restricted to one direction of movement, where the roadway is free from 
obstructions and of sufficient width for two or more lines of moving vehi-
cles. 
(2) The operator of a vehicle may overtake and pass another vehicle upon 
the right only under conditions permitting the movement with safety. The 
movement may not be made by driving off the roadway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 46; C. 1943, 
57-7-123; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 11; 1978, ch. 33, 
§ 12; 1987, ch. 138, § 55. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (l)(c) substituted "high-
way" for "street" and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation throughout the 
section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Arn. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 265. 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 326. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ~ 172(2). 
41-6-57. Limitation on passing - Prohibitions. 
1(1) A vehicle may not be operated to the left side of the center of the road-
way in overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direc-
tion unless the left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a 
sufficient distance ahead to permit overtaking and passing to be completed 
without interfering with the operation of any vehicle approaching from the 
opposite direction of any vehicle overtaken. 
(2) Overtaking and passing under this section may not be made where 
prohibited by Section 41-6-58. 
(3) The overtaking vehicle shall return to an authorized lane of travel as 
soon as practical, and if the passing movement involves the use of a lane 
authorized for vehicles approaching in the opposite direction, before coming 
within 200 feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 47; C. 1943, 
57-7-124; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 15; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 56. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment designated the previously undesignated 
provisions of this section, in Subsection (1) sub-
stituted "operated" for "driven," inserted the 
present Subsection (2) and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Applicability. 
Vehicles are not always prohibited from 
using the left side of the highway; and when 
they do so in conformity with law and in due 
care, it is not negligence. Thus where defen-
dant turned his car to the left in order to see 
around a truck and see if it was clear to pass, 
and was then struck by plaintiffs car coming 
in the opposite direction, it was not negligence 
on the defendant's part. Weenig Bros. v. Man-
ning, 1 Utah 2d 101, 262 P.2d 491 (1953). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7 A Arn. Jur. 2d, Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 262. 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 326. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles = 172(2). 
41-6-58. Limitations on driving on left side of road - Ex-
ceptions. 
(1) A vehicle may not be operated on the left side of the roadway: 
(a) when approaching or on a crest of a grade or a curve on the highway 
where the operator's view is obstructed within a distance which creates a 
hazard if another vehicle may approach from the opposite direction; 
(b) when approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection 
or railroad grade crossing unless otherwise indicated by official traffic-
control devices or a peace officer; or 
(c) when the view is obstructed upon approaching within 100 feet of 
any bridge, viaduct, or tunnel. 
(2) This section does not apply on a one-way roadway, nor under the condi-
tions described in Subsection 41-6-53(1)(b) nor to the operator of a vehicle 
turning left onto or from an alley, private road, or driveway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 48; C. 1943, 
57-7-125; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 16; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 57. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment redesignated the provision of this section 
as set out in the bound volume, substituted 
"operator" for "driver" throughout the section, 
in Subsection (1) substituted "operated" for 
"driven," in Subsection (l)(b) added "unless 
otherwise indicated by official traffic-control 
devices or a peace officer" at the end, in Sub-
section (2) substituted "Subsection 41-6-
53(1)(b)" for "section 41-6-53(a)(2)" and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Driving on left within 100 feet of intersection. 
"Intersection" construed. 
Passing within 100 feet of intersection. 
Violation as evidence of negligence. 
Driving on left within 100 feet of intersec-
tion. 
It was held that lower court properly di-
rected a verdict of no cause of action where 
plaintiff did not make turn at intersection, but 
some 50 feet prior to the intersection. Hart v. 
Kerr, 110 Utah 479, 175 P.2d 475 (1946). 
"Intersection" construed. 
Jury was properly instructed that site of col-
lision was "intersection" under this section in 
light of evidence that crossing road intersected 
main highway from both east and west and 
crossed it at right angles, that main highway 
was widened for about 1/10 of a mile in both 
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directions to provide extra lane for acceleration 
and deceleration in entering or leaving high-
way and that there were stop signs at both east 
and west side to warn oncoming traffic. The 
result was not changed by fact that crossing 
road was only infrequently traveled dirt road 
and not readily observable to main highway 
traveler. Hathaway v. Marx, 21 Utah 2d 33, 
439 P.2d 850 (1968). 
In order to determine whether an intersec-
tion exists for purposes of Subsection (a)(2) 
(now (l)(b)), it must first be determined 
whether the two roads that form the juncture 
are properly maintained as required by stat-
ute, and, second, it must be determined 
whether a driver of the vehicle approaching 
the juncture would be warned that an intersec-
tion of two public roads exists. Johnson v. Mat-
lock, 771 F.2d 1432 (10th Cir. 1985). 
Passing within 100 feet of intersection. 
An instruction that a driver had no right in 
attempting to pass at an intersection was error 
where, at the point where the collision oc-
curred there were no markers prohibiting pass-
ing, there was nothing to indicate a turn-off 
road from the highway, and no markers show-
ing that a road left the highway in the area. 
Douglas v. Gigandet, 8 Utah 2d 245, 332 P.2d 
932 (1958). 
Violation as evidence of negligence. 
Violations of standards of safety set by stat-
ute are regarded as prima facie evidence of 
negligence subject only to justification or ex-
cuse. Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254 
(D. Utah 1968), affd, 409 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 
1969). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7 A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 263. 
A.L.R. - Street or highway intersection 
within traffic rules, definition, 7 A.L.R.3d 
1204. 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 268. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles eca 153. 
41-6-59. Signs and markings on roadway - No passing 
zones - Exceptions. 
(1) (a) The Department of Transportation and local authorities may deter-
mine those portions of any highway under their respective jurisdictions 
where overtaking and passing or driving on the left of the roadway is 
especially hazardous and may by appropriate signs or markings on the 
highway indicate the beginning and end of those zones. 
(b) When the signs or markings are in place and clearly visible to a 
reasonably observant person, every operator of a vehicle shall obey the 
directions. 
(2) Where signs or markings are in place to define a no-passing zone under 
Subsection (1), an operator may not drive on the left side of the roadway 
within the no-passing zone or on the left side of any pavement striping de-
signed to mark the no-passing zone throughout its lengths. 
(3) This section does not apply to Subsection 41-6-53(1)(b) nor to the opera-
tor of a vehicle turning left onto or from an alley, private road, or driveway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 49; C. 1943, 
57-7-126; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 17; 1978, ch. 33, 
§ 13; 1987, ch. 138, § 58. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment designated the previously undesignated 
provisions of Subsection (l)(a), substituted "op-
erator" for "driver" throughout the section, in 
Subsection (l)(a) substituted "highway" for 
"roadway," in Subsection (l)(b) substituted "a 
reasonably observant" for "an ordinarily obser-
vant," in Subsection (3) substituted "Subsec-
tion 41-6-53(1)(b)" for "section 41-6-53(a)(2)" 
and made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation throughout the section. 
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41-6-60. One-way traffic. 
(1) The Department of Transportation and local authorities may designate 
any highway, roadway, part of a roadway, or specific lanes under their respec-
tive jurisdictions upon which vehicular traffic shall proceed in one direction at 
all times or as otherwise indicated by official traffic-control devices. 
(2) On a roadway designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall be operated 
only in the direction indicated by official traffic-control devices. 
(3) A vehicle passing around a rotary traffic island shall be operated only to 
the right of the island. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 50; C. 1943, 
57-7-127; L. 1969, ch. 109, § 1; 1979, ch. 242, 
§ 15; 1987, ch. 138, § 59. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment redesignated the provisions of this sec-
tion, substituted "operated" for "driven" both 
places it appears and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation throughout the 
section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ~ 14. 
41-6-61. Roadway divided into marked lanes-. Provisions 
- Traffic-control devices. 
On a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the 
following provisions apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical entirely within a 
single lane and may not be moved from the lane until the operator has 
determined the movement can be made safely. 
(2) On a roadway divided into three lanes and providing for two-way 
movement of traffic, a vehicle may not be operated in the center lane 
except: 
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle traveling in the 
same direction, and when the center lane is clear of traffic within a 
safe distance; or 
(b) in preparation of making or completing a left turn or where the 
center lane is allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the same 
direction that the vehicle is proceeding and the allocation is desig-
nated by official traffic-control devices. 
(3) Official traffic-control devices may be erected directing specified 
traffic to use a designated lane or designating those lanes to be used by 
traffic moving in a particular direction regardless of the center of the 
roadway. Operators of vehicles shall obey the directions of these devices. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 51; C. 1943, 
57-7-128; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 18; 1978, ch. 33, § 14; 1987, ch. 138, § 60. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operated" for "driven" 
throughout the section, in Subsection (3) sub-
stituted "operators" for "drivers" and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
41-6-62 
Violation as evidence of negligence. 
Violations of standards of safety set by stat-
ute are regarded as prima facie evidence of 
negligence subject only to justification or ex-
cuse. Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254 
(D. Utah 1968), atrd, 409 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 
1969). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 274. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles e:o 153. 
41-6-62. Following another vehicle - Safe distance - Car-
avan or motorcade - Exception for funeral pro-
cession. 
(1) The operator of a vehicle may not follow another vehicle more closely 
than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the speed of the vehicles 
and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway. 
(2) Motor vehicles operated upon any roadway outside of an urban district, 
whether in a caravan, motorcade, or otherwise, or whether or not towing other 
vehicles, shall allow sufficient space between each vehicle or combination of 
vehicles to enable any other vehicle to enter and occupy the space without 
danger. This provision does not apply to funeral processions. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 52; C. 1943, 
57-7-129; L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 19; 1978, ch. 33, § 15; 1987, ch. 138, § 61. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (1) substituted "operator" 
for "driver," deleted the former Subsection (2) 
concerning following by vehicles or trucks tow-
ing another vehicle, and redesignated the for-
mer Subsection (3) as Subsection (2), in Subsec-
tion (2) substituted "an urban district, 
whether" for "a business or residence district" 
and inserted "or otherwise" following "caravan 
or motorcade" and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation throughout the 
section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Violation as evidence of negligence. 
Cited. 
Violation as evidence of negligence. 
Violations of standards of safety set by stat-
ute are regarded as prima facie evidence of 
negligence subject only to justification or ex-
cuse. Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254 
(D. Utah 1968), affd, 409 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 
1969). 
Cited in King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 
(Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jut. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic §§ 260 to 265. 
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Key Numbers. - Automobiles e=> 172(2). 
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ARTICLE 8 
TURNS AND SIGNALS ON STARTING, STOPPING 
OR TURNING 
41-6-66. Turning - Manner - Traffic-control devices. 
The operator of a vehicle shall make turns as follows: 
(1) Right turns: both a right turn and an approach for a right turn shall 
be made as close as practical to the right-hand curb or edge of the road-
way. 
(2) Left turns: the operator of a vehicle intending to turn left shall 
approach the turn from the extreme left-hand lane for traffic moving in 
the same direction. Whenever practicable, the left turn shall be made by 
turning onto the roadway being entered in the extreme left-hand lane for 
traffic moving in the new direction, unless otherwise directed by an offi-
cial traffic-control device. 
(3) Two-way left turn lanes: where a special lane for making left turns 
by operators proceeding in opposite directions has been indicated by offi-
cial traffic-control devices: 
(a) a left turn may not be made from any other lane; and 
(b) a vehicle may not be driven in the lane except when preparing 
for or making a left turn from or into the roadway or when preparing 
for or making a U-turn when permitted by law. 
(4) The Department of Transportation and local authorities in their 
respective jurisdictions may cause official traffic-control devices to be 
placed and require and direct that a different course from that specified in 
this section be traveled by turning vehicles. The operator of a vehicle may 
not turn a vehicle other than as directed by those devices. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 53; C. 1943, 
57-7-130; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 22; 1978, ch. 33, § 17; 1987, ch. 138, § 65. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operator" for "driver" 
throughout the section, in Subsection (2) re-
wrote the second sentence, redesignated the 
former Subsection (4) as present Subsection (3) 
and inserted at the beginning "Two-way left 
turn lanes," redesignated the former Subsec-
tion (3) as the present Subsection (4), and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Contributory negligence. 
Whether decedent's turn from an improper 
position on the highway without signaling was 
contributory negligence was question for jury 
under facts of case. Hansen v. Nicholas Moving 
& Storage, Inc., 451 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1971). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 3d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic §§ 256 to 259. 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 367. 
A.L.R. - Automobiles: liability for U-turn 
collisions, 53 A.L.R.4th 849. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles P 171(12). 
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41-6-67. Turning around-Where prohibited-Visibility. 
(1) The operator of any vehicle may not turn the vehicle to proceed in the 
opposite direction unless the movement can be made safely and without inter-
fering with other traffic. 
(2) A vehicle may not be turned to proceed in the opposite direction on any 
curve, or upon the approach to, or near the crest of a grade, if the vehicle is not 
visible at a distance of 500 feet by the operator of any other vehicle approach-
ing from either direction. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 54; C. 1943, 
57-7-131; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 23; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 66. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment redesignated former Subsections (a) and 
(b) as present Subsections (1) and (2), substi-
tuted "operator" for "driver" throughout the 
section and made minor changes in phraseol• 
ogy and punctuation throughout the section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Degree of care. 
The general rules as to degree of care re-
quired of a person acting in an emergency, cre-
ated by wrongful act or negligence of defen-
dant, apply to this section. Morrison v. Perry, 
104 Utah 139, 122 P.2d 191 (1942), rev'd on 
rehearing, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772 (1943). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Automobiles: liability for U-turn 
collisions, 53 A.L.R.4th 849. 
41-6-68. Moving a vehicle - Safety. 
A person may not move a vehicle which is stopped, standing, or parked until 
the movement may be made with reasonable safety. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 55; C. 1943, 
57-7-132; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 67. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "A person may not move" for 
"No person shall start" and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Evidence sufficient. 
In action for damages arising out of collision 
between motorcycle and truck, evidence was 
sufficient to support jury's finding that defen-
dant, in violation of this section, moved his 
truck onto highway, from point where truck 
was parked on shoulder of highway, before 
such movement could be made with reasonable 
safety. Spackman v. Carson, 117 Utah 390, 216 
P.2d 640 (1950). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 282. 
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Key Numbers. - Automobiles ,g:, 173(8). 
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41-6-69. Turning or changing lanes - Safety - Signals -
Stopping or sudden decrease in speed - Signal 
flashing - Where prohibited. 
(1) (a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a road-
way or change lanes until the movement can be made with reasonable 
safety and an appropriate signal has been given. 
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to change lanes shall be 
given continuously for at least the last three seconds preceding the begin-
ning of the turn or change. 
(2) A person may not stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle with-
out first giving an appropriate signal to the operator of any vehicle immedi-
ately to the rear when there is opportunity to give a signal. 
(3) The signals required on vehicles by Section 41-6-70 may not be flashed 
on one side only on a disabled vehicle, flashed as a courtesy or "do pass" to 
operators of other vehicles approaching from the rear, or flashed on one side 
only of a parked vehicle except as necessary to comply with this section. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 56; C. 1943, 
57-7-133; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1971, ch. 96, 
§ 1; 1975, ch. 207, § 24; 1978, ch. 33, § 18; 
1987, ch. 138, § 68. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment redesignated former Subsections (1) and 
(2) as present Subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b) and 
redesignated the remaining subsections ac-
cordingly; in Subsection (l)(a) inserted "or 
change lanes" following "roadway"; in Subsec-
tion (2) substituted "operator" for "driver" and 
made minor changes in phraseology and punc-
tuation throughout the section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Contributory negligence. 
Determination of "reasonable safety." 
Effect of infant's capacity upon statutory duty. 
Pedestrians. 
Question for jury. 
Stopping or suddenly decreasing speed. 
Contributory negligence. 
Whether decedent's turn from an improper 
position on the highway without signaling was 
contributory negligence was question for jury 
under facts of case. Hansen v. Nicholas Moving 
& Storage, Inc., 451 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1971). 
Determination of "reasonable safety." 
Facts may be so clear and indisputable that 
it may be said as a matter of law that turn 
could not be made "with reasonable safety," 
and that defendant's act in turning was, as a 
matter oflaw, the sole proximate cause of the 
collision and resulting damage, thus leaving to 
the jury the determination of the amount of 
such damage. Cederloff v. Whited, 110 Utah 
45, 169 P.2d 777 (1946). 
Effect of infant's capacity upon statutory 
duty. 
Consideration of an infant's age and capacity 
should prevail over rule establishing negli-
gence as a matter of law upon violation of stat-
utory duty. This does not mean that statutory 
violation rule is nullified where children are 
involved. Morby v. Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252 
P.2d 231 (1953) (13-year-old bicyclist who 
turned without signaling). 
Pedestrians. 
Pedestrian denied recovery for injuries sus-
tained when she was struck by overhang of mo-
torbus, where from the evidence it appeared 
that when she was halfway across the street 
the traffic light changed against her and she 
stopped in the safety zone, giving the other 
traffic the right-of-way, and that the overhang 
of the bus struck her as it rounded the corner 
in response to traffic officer's express direction. 
Miller v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 96 Utah 
369, 86 P.2d 37 (1939). 
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Question for jury. 
Whether a truck driver was negligent in fail-
ing to look in his rearview mirror at the time of 
a left turn, and whether his negligence, if any, 
was a proximate cause of the injury were ques-
tions for the jury. Hayden v. Cederlund, 1 Utah 
2d 171, 263 P.2d 796 (1953). 
Stopping or suddenly decreasing speed. 
Where the statute required defendant to give 
an appropriate signal before stopping or sud-
denly decreasing his speed and no hand signal 
was given, the visible light showing the appli-
cation of defendant's brakes was not compli-
ance with the statute since it was simulta-
neous with the sudden decrease in speed, while 
the statute requires that an appropriate signal 
be given prior to stopping or suddenly decreas-
ing the speed of a vehicle. United States v. 
First Sec. Bank, 208 F.2d 424, 42 A.L.R.2d 951 
(10th Cir. 1953). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 287. 
A.L.R. - Automobiles: liability for U-turn 
collisions, 53 A.L.R.4th 849. 
41-6-70. Signals - Methods. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ~ 151. 
A stop or turn signal when required shall be given either by the hand and 
arm or by signal lamps. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 57; C. 1943, 
57-7-134; L. 1955, ch. 71, § l; 1957, ch. 78, 
§ 4; 1978, ch. 33, § 19; 1987, ch. 138, § 69. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment deleted Subsection (2), deleted the former 
designation of Subsection (1) and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation. 
41-6-71. Signals - How made. 
Signals required to be given by hand and arm shall be given from the left 
side of the vehicle as follows: 
(1) Left turn: hand and arm extended horizontally; 
(2) Right turn: hand and arm extended upward; and 
(3) Stop or decrease speed: hand and arm extended downward. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 58; C. 1943, 
57-7-135; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 70. 
ment made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation throughout the section. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ARTICLE 9 
RIGHT-OF-WAY 
41-6-72. Unregulated intersection 
tween vehicles. 
Right-of-way be-
(1) Except as specified in Subsection (2), when more than one vehicle enters 
or approaches an unregulated or an all-way stop intersection from different 
highways at approximately the same time, the operator of the vehicle on the 
left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right unless otherwise 
directed by a peace officer. 
(2) When approaching an unregulated intersection the operator of a vehicle 
on a highway that does not continue beyond the intersection shall yield the 
right-of-way to the operator of any vehicle on the intersecting highway. 
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History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 59; C. 1943, 
57-7-136; L. 1961, ch. 86, § l; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 25; 1987, ch. 138, § 71. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment rewrote the section to the extent that a 
detailed analysis is impracticable. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Contributory negligence of favored driver. 
Degree of care. 
Duties are relative. 
Duty to yield. 
Motor bike driver. 
Question for jury. 
Contributory negligence of favored driver. 
Although driver approaching from right had 
right-of-way over driver approaching from left, 
the right is not absolute and one who has it 
may not claim it in face of danger which one 
exercising due care could see and avoid. The 
driver having right-of-way was nevertheless 
contributorily negligent in light of evidence 
that he had not kept proper lookout. Hughes v. 
Hooper, 19 Utah 2d 389, 431 P.2d 983 (1967). 
Degree of care. 
In crowded street, a great.er degree of care 
and vigilance is required in approaching inter-
sections and crossings where both pedestrians 
and vehicles of all kinds have right to pass 
both ways, than is case between street cross-
ings. Richards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 
409, 186 P. 439 (1919). 
Duties are relative. 
The rights and duties prescribed by this sec-
tion are only relative, and must be applied in 
the light of the conditions existing at the time. 
It is the duty of both parties to use such cau-
tion as a reasonably prudent person would 
have done in entering the intersection and to 
yield the right-of-way if under the circum-
stances a reasonably prudent person would 
have done so. If failure to yield right-of-way 
proximately contributed to the accident, that 
may bar plaintiff or render defendant liable. 
Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 P. 893 (1929). 
The rights of the possessor of the right-of-
way under this section are only relative, and 
one is not relieved of the duty of using due care 
simply because he is the apparent possessor of 
the right-of-way. The question is: Whose negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the accident 
and injury, and not simply who entered the 
intersection first. Sine v. Salt Lake Transp. 
Co., 106 Utah 289, 147 P.2d 875 (1944). 
Duty to yield. 
Driver on left at street intersection is not 
required to yield right-of-way to driver ap-
proaching from right unless collision is to be 
"reasonably apprehended." Collins v. Liddle, 
67 Utah 242, 247 P. 476 (1926). 
Duty of drivers at street intersections is dis-
cussed at length in Sine v. Salt Lake Transp. 
Co., 106 Utah 289, 147 P.2d 875 (1944). 
Motorist approaching intersection from right 
had right-of-way over motorist approaching 
from left if former either reached the intersec-
tion first or at the same time as latter. Martin 
v. Sheffield, 112 Utah 478, 189 P.2d 127 
(1948). 
Motor bike driver. 
"Driver" as used in this section included 
thirteen-year-old motor bike driver, and his 
failure to yield right-of-way barred his recov-
ery for injuries sustained when struck by mo-
torist. Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 25 Utah 2d 
168, 478 P.2d 496 (1970). 
Questions for jury. 
In action arising out of intersection collision, 
evidence sufficiently established prima facie 
case of negligence on part of defendant in fail-
ing to yield right-of-way and in traveling at 
excessive rate of speed, and contributory negli-
gence on part of plaintiff in failing to keep 
proper lookout and in traveling at excessive 
rate of speed was for jury. Martin v. Sheffield, 
112 Utah 478, 189 P.2d 127 (1948). 
The mere fact that a driver has the right-of-
way does not excuse him from exercising due 
care and keeping a proper lookout to avoid col-
lisions with vehicles failing to yield; however, 
questions relating to rights and duties of 
drivers approaching intersections are primar-
ily problems to be resolved by the trier of fact 
and only when reasonable minds could not dif-
fer in reaching a contrary determination does 
it become necessary to upset these factual reso-
lutions. Country Club Foods v. Barney, 10 
Utah 2d 317, 352 P.2d 776 (1960). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 236 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 363. 
A.L.R. - What is street or highway inter• 
section within traffic rules, 7 A.L.R.3d 1204. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ~ 171(4). 
41-6-72.10. Right-of-way- Stop or yield signals-Yield-
Collisions at intersections or junctions of road-
ways - Evidence. 
(1) Preferential right-of-way may be indicated by stop signs or yield signs 
under Section 41-6-99. 
(2) Except when directed to proceed by a peace officer, every operator of a 
vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if 
none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, but if 
none, then at a point nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has 
a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. 
After having stopped, the operator shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle 
in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to consti-
tute an immediate hazard during the time when the operator is moving across 
or within the intersection or junction ofroadways. The operator shall yield the 
right-of-way to pedestrians within an adjacent crosswalk. 
(3) (a) The operator of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall slow down to 
a speed reasonable for the existing conditions and if required for safety, 
shall stop as provided under Subsection (2). 
(b) After slowing or stopping, the operator shall yield the right-of-way 
to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so 
closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time the operator 
is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways. The 
operator shall yield to pedestrians within an adjacent crosswalk. If the 
operator is involved in a collision with a vehicle in the intersection or 
junction of roadways or with a pedestrian at an adjacent crosswalk, after 
passing a yield sign without stopping, the collision is prima facie evidence 
of the operator's failure to yield the right-of-way, but is not considered 
negligence per se in determining liability for the accident. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-72.10, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 207, § 26; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 20; 
1987, ch. 138, § 72. . 
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1975, 
ch. 207, § 26 repealed former § 41-6-72.10 (L. 
1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1961, ch. 86, § 1), relating to 
right-of-way between vehicles, and enacted 
present § 41-6-72.10. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operator" for "driver" 
throughout the section; in Subsection (2) sub-
stituted "peace officer" for "police officer" and 
added the present third sentence; in Subsection 
(3) designated the previously undesignated 
provisions; in Subsection (3)(a) substituted "as 
provided under Subsection (2)" for "at a clearly 
marked stop line, and if none, before entering 
the crosswalk on the near side of the intersec-
tion, or if none, then at the point nearest the 
intersecting roadway where the driver has a 
view of approaching traffic on the intersection 
roadway before entering it"; in Subsection 
(3)(b) inserted the present second sentence; in 
the present third sentence substituted "If the 
operator" for "Provided, that if such a driver," 
and inserted at the end of the third sentence 
"but is not considered negligence per se in de-
termining liability for the accident"; and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
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Testimony that disfavored vehicle was well 
into or through intersection at time of collision 
with favored vehicle did not establish that ap-
proaching favored vehicle was not an immedi-
ate hazard. Cintron v. Milkovich, 611 P.2d 730 
(Utah 1980). 
Speeding drivers. 
Right-of-way is not transferred to a disfa-
vored driver by fact that favored driver exceeds 
the posted speed. Cintron v. Milkovich, 611 
P.2d 730 (Utah 1980). 
41-6-73. Vehicle turning left - Yield right-of-way. 
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall yield the right-
of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is so close 
to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 60; C. 1943, 
57-7-137; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 27; 1987, ch. 138, § 73. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operator" for "driver," de-
leted "within an intersection or into an alley, 
private road, or driveway" following "vehicle 
intending to turn to the left," and deleted 
"within the intersection or" following "from 
the opposite direction which is." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Burden placed on driver making turn. 
Evidence. 
Fulfillment of duty. 
"Immediate hazard" construed. 
Instructions. 
Involuntary manslaughter. 
Violation not found. 
Burden placed on driver making turn. 
When a statute prescribes that a turning ve-
hicle must yield the right-of-way to another on 
a straight of way when the latter is close 
enough to constitute a hazard, it anticipates 
the exercise of reasonable judgment on the part 
of the driver turning. However, a burden is 
placed on the driver making the turn as he has 
control of the situation, and if there is a rea-
sonable probability that the movement cannot 
be made in safety then the disfavored driver 
should yield. French v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 117 
Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002 (1950). 
Evidence. 
Where prosecution grew out of a collision at 
an intersection, due to alleged reckless driving 
of defendant in making turn in violation of this 
section, Supreme Court thought "there was 
ample evidence of conduct of defendant which 
jury could properly find was reckless and in 
marked disregard for the rights and safety of 
others." State v. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144 
P.2d 290 (1943). 
Fulfillment of duty. 
If the left-turner, in performing his duty un-
der this section by making the required obser-
vation, sees no vehicle approaching, or that 
any coming are far enough away so that the 
left-turner can reasonably believe that he has 
time to make his turn, he may proceed. Where 
a dispute arises as to this point, the question is 
one for the jury. Smith v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 
344, 400 P.2d 570 (1965). 
"Immediate hazard" construed. 
In action arising out of collision between au-
tomobile driven by plaintiff and truck driven 
by defendant at intersection where plaintiff 
made left turn across path of approaching traf-
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fie, evidence conclusively established that 
truck was so close to intersection at time plain-
tiff made left turn as to constitute an "immedi-
ate hazard." French v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 117 
Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002 (1950), distinguished, 
Hardman v. Thurman, 121 Utah 143, 239 P.2d 
215 (1951). 
Where the defendant attempted to turn 
across the path of the plaintiff, when he was 
only 40 feet away, the trial court could reason-
ably conclude that plaintiff was so close as to 
constitute an immediate hazard and that the 
defendant should have yielded the right-of-way 
to him. Yeates v. Budge, 122 Utah 518, 252 
P.2d 220 (1953). 
Instructions. 
There is no right to an instruction covering 
the qualifying part of this section, unless there 
is evidence to support such a charge. State v. 
Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144 P.2d 290 (1943). 
Involuntary manslaughter. 
In a prosecution for involuntary manslaugh-
ter, no criminal liability is imposed upon the 
defendant because he crossed the line of on-
coming traffic, unless he did so recklessly or in 
willful or wanton disregard of the rights and 
safety of others. State v. Adamson, 101 Utah 
534, 125 P.2d 429 (1942). 
In involuntary manslaughter prosecution 
arising out of collision by defendant's car with 
car in which decedent was riding, wherein evi-
dence showed that latter car, making left turn 
short distance beyond intersection for purpose 
of entering intersecting street, had crossed al-
most completely over two lanes for oncoming 
traffic and had made short backward move-
ment before impact from defendant's oncoming 
automobile occurred, it could not be said as 
matter of law that left turn was not made in 
exercise of due care and, under all evidence, 
jury could find that, by reason of defendant's 
intoxicated condition, he failed to react in nor-
mal manner to situation which confronted him, 
and that his conduct was responsible cause of 
collision and resulting death. State v. 
McQuilkin, 113 Utah 268, 193 P.2d 433 (1948). 
Violation not found. 
Motorist who signaled for left turn and had 
almost completed it when defendant, who had 
just started from parked position, collided with 
rear end of motorist's car while trying to go 
through intersection, was not shown to have 
violated this section, notwithstanding that evi-
dence was at best controversial and was some-
what based on estimates as to split-second cir-
cumstances as to time, distance and judgment. 
Hawkins v. Allen, 16 Utah 2d 293, 400 P.2d 12 
(1965). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 256. 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 363. 
41-6-74, 41-6-74.10. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Laws 1987, ch. 138, § 106 re-
pealed § 41-6-74, as last amended by Laws 
1961, ch. 86, § 1, concerning vehicles entering 
a through highway. 
A.L.R. - What is street or highway inter-
section within traffic rules, 7 A.L.R.3d 1204. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles~ 171(4). 
Laws 1987, ch. 138, § 106, repealed 
§ 41-6-74.10, as last amended by Laws 1961, 
ch. 86, § 2, concerning failure to yield right-of-
way. 
41-6-75. Entering or crossing highway other than from an-
other roadway - Yield right-of-way. 
The operator of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from any place 
other than another highway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles ap-
proaching on the highway to be entered or crossed. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 62; C. 1943, 
57-7-139; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 28; 1978, ch. 33, 
§ 21; 1987, ch. 138, § 74. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operator" for "driver" and 
substituted "highway" for "roadway" both 
places it appears. 
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Last clear chance doctrine. 
Rights and duties of drivers. 
Contributory negligence. 
Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law, where plaintiff, driv-
ing at 25 miles per hour on icy highway, first 
saw defendant's bus being backed out of yard 
when plaintiff was approximately 300 feet 
from defendant's driveway, and plaintiff ap-
plied his brakes when about half the distance 
from the driveway upon realizing that defen-
dant was not going to yield right-of-way, but 
was unable to avoid collision with defendant 
who had backed entirely across road. Nielson 
v. Mauchley, 115 Utah 68, 202 P.2d 547 (1949). 
Last clear chance doctrine. 
The doctrine of last clear chance is well es-
tablished in Utah, not only where the defen-
dant actually knew of plaintiffs peril, but also 
where defendant, in the exercise of reasonable 
care, should have known that plaintiff was so 
endangered. Beckstrom v. Williams, 3 Utah 2d 
210, 282 P.2d 309 (1955). 
As a general rule the doctrine of last clear 
chance is of limited application in the case of 
two moving vehicles as the application of the 
doctrine in a case where both vehicles were 
moving and rapidly changing positions with 
respect to one another is fraught with difficul-
ties. However, where one vehicle is moving 
very slowly this limitation of the doctrine is 
much less cogent. Beckstrom v. Williams, 3 
Utah 2d 210, 282 P.2d 309 (1955). 
Rights and duties of drivers. 
This section does not give driver of vehicle 
who has right-of-way the right to proceed with-
out regard to existing conditions, and such 
driver must exercise due care and act as a rea-
sonably prudent man would act under all exist-
ing circumstances. Nielson v. Mauchley, 115 
Utah 68, 202 P.2d 547 (1949). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 242. 
41-6-75.5. Merging lanes 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 347. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles e-- 167(3). 
Yielding. 
The operator of a vehicle traveling in a lane that is about to merge into 
another lane shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the lane 
or lanes into which the lane of the operator is merging and which are so close 
as to be an immediate hazard. This section does not apply to entry lanes to 
limited access highways. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-75.5, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 338, § l; 1987, ch. 138, § 75. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operator" for "driver" and 
made a minor change in phraseology. 
41-6-76. Emergency vehicle - Necessary signals - Duties 
of respective drivers. 
(1) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle using 
audible or visual signals under Section 41-6-14, 41-6-132, or 41-6-146 or of a 
peace officer vehicle lawfully using an audible or visual signal, the operator of 
every other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and immediately move to a 
position parallel to, and as close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of 
the highway, clear of any intersection and shall stop and remain there until 
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the authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed 
by a peace officer. 
(2) This section does not relieve the operator of an authorized emergency 
vehicle from the duty to drive with regard for the safety of all persons using 
the highway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 63; C. 1943, 
57-7-140; L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1955, ch. 71, 
§ l; 1975, ch. 207, § 29; 1987, ch. 138, § 76. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment redesignated the provisions of this sec-
tion, substituted "peace officer" for "police offi-· 
cer" throughout the section, substituted "oper-
ator" for "driver" throughout the section, in 
Subsection (1) substituted "under Section 
41-6-14, 41-6-132, or 41-6-146," for "meeting 
the requirements of this act" and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 244. 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 371. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <P 175(3). 
41-6-76.10. Vehicle or pedestrian working upon highway 
- Right-of-way. 
The operator of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to any: 
(1) authorized vehicle or pedestrian actually engaged in work upon a 
highway within any highway construction or maintenance area indicated 
by official traffic-control devices; or 
(2) authorized vehicle obviously and actually engaged in work upon a 
highway when the vehicle displays lights meeting the requirements of 
Section 41-6-140.20. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-76.10, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 207, § 30; 1987, ch. 138, § 77. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment changed the subsection designations 
from letters to numbers, substituted "operator" 
for "driver" and made minor changes in phra-
seology and punctuation throughout the sec-
tion. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 245. 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 382. 
A.L.R. - Liability for automobile accident, 
other than direct collision with pedestrian, as 
affected by reliance upon or disregard of stop-
and-go signal, 2 A.L.R.3d 12. 
Liability for collision of automobile with pe-
destrian at intersection as affected by reliance 
upon or disregard of stop-and-go signal, 2 
A.L.R.3d 155. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <P 160(5). 
ARTICLE 10 
PEDESTRIANS' RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
41-6-77. Pedestrians subject to traffic-control devices 
Other controls. 
(1) A pedestrian shall obey the instructions of any official traffic-control 
464 
TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-78 
device specifically applicable to him unless otherwise directed by a peace 
officer. 
(2) Pedestrians are subject to traffic and pedestrian-control signals under 
Sections 41-6-24 and 41-6-25. 
History: C. 1953, 4106-77, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 49; 1987, ch. 138, § 78. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (1) substituted "peace offi-
cer" for "police officer," in Subsection (2) sub-
stituted "64-6-24" for "41-6-24," deleted former 
Subsection (3), and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 285 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles§ 35; 60A 
C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 382. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles e=> 5 to 7, 
160(3). 
41-6-78. Pedestrians' right-of-way - Duty of pedestrian. 
(1) (a) When traffic-control signals are not in place or not in operation, the 
operator of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way, slowing down or stop-
ping if necessary to yield, to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a 
crosswalk when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon 
which the vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestrian is approaching so 
closely from the opposite half of the roadway as to be in danger. This 
subsection does not apply under conditions of Subsection 41-6-79(2). 
(b) A pedestrian may not suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety 
and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close as to constitute 
an immediate hazard. 
(2) When a vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at any unmarked 
crosswalk at an intersection to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the 
operator of any other vehicle approaching from the rear may not overtake and 
pass the stopped vehicle. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 65; C. 1943, 
57-7-142; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 31; 1978, ch. 33, § 22; 1987, ch. 138, § 79. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operator" for "driver" 
throughout the section, in Subsection (l)(a) in-
serted the present last sentence, in Subsection 
(l)(b) deleted the former last sentence which 
read "Paragraph (l)(a) shall not apply under 
the conditions stated in section 41-6-79(2)" and 
made minor changes in phraseology and punc-
tuation throughout the section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Duty of driver to yield right-of-way. 
Instructions on "sudden emergency." 
Right-of-way. 
Rights of pedestrians generally. 
-Contributory negligence. 
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Duty of driver to yield right-of-way. 
Statutes or ordinances giving pedestrians 
the right-of-way at street crossings create a 
preferential but not an absolute right in the 
pedestrian's favor, and before the duty of a 
driver to yield the right-of-way arises, he must 
be in a situation whereby he is either aware of 
the presence of the pedestrian or should have, 
in the exercise of reasonable care, become 
aware of the presence of the pedestrian in time 
to yield the right-of-way. Charvoz v. Cottrell, 
12 Utah 2d 25, 361 P.2d 516 (1961). 
Instructions on "sudden emergency." 
It was not error for the trial court to refuse to 
give an instruction on sudden emergency 
where the plaintiffs requested instruction did 
not cover the requisite element that the emer-
gency must be one which arose without fault 
on the part of the plaintiff and defendant's evi-
dence showed that plaintiff ran in front of de-
fendant's vehicle when the latter was too close 
to avoid striking him. Gitten v. Lundberg, 3 
Utah 2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115 (1955). 
Right-of-way. 
A pedestrian in a marked crosswalk has the 
right-of-way. The right-of-way rule simply 
means this: that if two persons are so proceed-
ing that if they continued their course there 
would be danger of collision, the disfavored one 
must give way, and the favored one (the pedes-
trian) may proceed; and the favored one may 
assume that this will be done. It is of course 
recognized that the right-of-way rule would not 
apply if, when the favored one approached the 
crossing point, the disfavored one was so close 
that in due care he could not or should not 
reasonably be expected to give way. Coombs v. 
Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 680 (1954). 
Rights of pedestrians generally. 
-Contributory negligence. 
Rights of pedestrians to use public streets 
are same as those of motorists and hence same 
general duties devolve upon them, and pedes• 
trian crossing public street in crosswalk or pe-
destrian lane, although he may have right-of-
way over vehicular traffic, has duty to observe 
such traffic, so that pedestrian who undertakes 
to cross busy street of large city, without first 
observing for vehicular traffic, is guilty of con-
tributory negligence, even though he may be 
crossing in crosswalk and have right-of-way. 
Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P.2d 495 
(1949), where deceased pedestrian who was 
struck by car while crossing street on cross-
walk in Salt Lake City was held to be contribu-
torily negligent as matter of law in failing to 
keep proper lookout for approaching traffic. 
In determining whether it must be ruled as a 
matter of law that a pedestrian herself was 
negligent which contributed to cause her in-
jury, consideration must be given, not only to 
the fact that she had the right-of-way upon 
which she could place some reliance, but also 
that a pedestrian crossing a busy street must 
be constantly vigilant for her safety with re-
spect to all of the conditions around her. Even 
if a car is seen approaching, unless it is so 
positioned as to constitute an immediate haz-
ard to her, she is not necessarily obliged to 
focus full and undivided attention on that par-
ticular car and so calculate her entire conduct 
as to avoid being struck by it. Due care re-
quires that she also keep a lookout ahead for 
other pedestrians, possible holes or obstruc-
tions in the street, and at least remain aware 
of the possibility of other traffic. Coombs v. 
Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 680 (1954). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic §§ 245 to 247. 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 388. 
A.L.R. - Failure to comply with statute 
regulating travel by pedestrian along highway 
as affecting right to recovery for injuries or 
death resulting from collision with automobile, 
45 A.L.R.3d 658. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ea> 160(4). 
41-6-79. Pedestrians yielding right-of-way - Limits on pe-
destrians. 
(1) A pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a 
marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall 
yield the right-of-way to all vehicles on the roadway. 
(2) A pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point where there is a pedestrian 
tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing shall yield the right-of-way to all 
vehicles upon the roadway. 
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(3) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic-control signals are in 
operation, pedestrians may not cross at any place except in a marked cross-
walk. 
(4) A pedestrian may not cross a roadway intersection diagonally unless 
authorized by official traffic-control devices, and if authorized to cross diago-
nally, shall cross only as directed by the appropriate official traffic-control 
devices. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-79, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 207, § 32; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 23; 
1987, ch. 138, § 80. 
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1975, 
ch. 207, § 32 repealed former § 41-6-79 (L. 
1941, ch. 52, § 66; C. 1943, 57-7-143; L. 1969, 
ch. 110, § 1), relating to pedestrians yielding 
the right of way, crossing roadways only at 
marked crosswalks and prohibiting pedes-
trians from crossing intersections diagonally, 
and enacted present § 41-6-79. 
Amendment Notes. - Tbe 1987 amend-
ment made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation throughout the section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Contributory negligence. 
Pedestrian walking along driveway. 
Purpose of statute. 
Contributory negligence. 
Pedestrian was contributorily negligent as 
matter of law, where he proceeded to cross 
street at night at place other than marked 
crosswalk, knowing that there were traffic con-
trol lights and marked crosswalks at adjacent 
intersections, and failed to constantly observe 
movement of approaching traffic after reaching 
a position approximately eight feet past center 
of street. Sant v. Miller, 115 Utah 559, 206 
P.2d 719 (1949). 
Pedestrian who was walking across poorly lit 
highway was contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law where, in response to a call from 
his wife, he turned and walked directly into 
path of defendant's automobile. Crossing a 
highway at a point where there was no marked 
crosswalk, the pedestrian was duty bound to 
yield the right-of-way to a vehicle upon the 
roadway. Cox v. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254 
P.2d 1047 (1953). 
A pedestrian was guilty of contributory neg-
ligence where after walking across two lanes of 
a four-lane highway within a marked cross-
walk she left the crosswalk and walked down 
the center of the street. By attempting to cross 
the street in disregard of safety rules, she was 
charged with a high standard of care, the duty 
being commensurate with the perilous circum-
stances. Smith v. Bennett, 1 Utah 2d 224, 265 
P.2d 401 (1953). 
Exclusion of rebuttal testimony as to motor-
ist's speed and refusal to reopen case to permit 
introduction of such testimony was not prejudi-
cial error in suit to recover for death of pedes-
trian who was struck while crossing street in 
area other than marked crosswalk since there 
was evidence as to decedent's negligence. Dun-
can v. Western Refrigeration Co., 11 Utah 2d 
19, 354 P.2d 572 (1960). 
Pedestrian walking along driveway. 
Motorist's general duty to stop before cross-
ing sidewalk was not applicable to situation in 
which pedestrian was walking along driveway 
and was not on a sidewalk when struck by car 
backing from garage; both parties had duty to 
use due care for safety of themselves and each 
other. Ivie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5,336 P.2d 
781 (1959). 
Purpose of statute. 
The right-of-way statutes are designed to 
prevent an accident by two persons, both other-
wise lawfully on the roadway, reaching the 
same place at the same time. The right-of-way 
is not absolute for either pedestrian or motor-
ist, but both have a continuing duty at all 
times to use reasonable care for the safety of 
others, even when one has the right-of-way 
over the other. Langlois v. Rees, 10 Utah 2d 
272, 351 P.2d 638 (1960). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. JUP. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 286. 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles§ 389. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ~ 160(1). 
41-6-79.10. Emergency vehicle - Necessary signals - Du-
ties of operator - Pedestrian to yield. 
(1) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle using 
audible or visual signals meeting the requirements of Section 41-6-14, 
41-6-132, or 41-6-146, or of a peace officer vehicle properly and lawfully mak-
ing use of an audible or visual signal, every pedestrian shall yield the right-of-
way to the authorized emergency vehicle. 
(2) This section does not relieve the operator of an authorized emergency 
vehicle from the duty to drive with regard for the safety of all persons using 
the highway, nor from the duty to exercise care to avoid colliding with any 
pedestrian. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-79.10, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 207, § 33; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 24; 
1987, ch. 138, § 81. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (1) substituted "41-6-132'' 
for "41-6-140" and "peace officer" for "police 
officer," in Subsection (2) substituted "opera-
tor" for "driver" and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation throughout the 
section. 
41-6-79.20. Passing closed railroad or bridge gate or bar. 
rier prohibited. 
A pedestrian may not pass thrm,1.gh, around, over, qnder, or remain upon 
any crossing gate or barrier at a railroad erossing or bridge while the gate or 
barrier is dosed or is being opened or closed. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-79.20, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 207, § 34; 1987, ch. 138, § 82. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation. 
41-6-80. Vehicles to exercise due care to avoid pedestrians 
- Audible signals and caution~ 
The operator of a vehicle shall exercise care to avoid colliding with any 
pedestrian and shall give an audible signal when necessary and exercise ap-
propriate precaution upon observing any child or any obviously confused, 
incapacitated, or intoxicated person. This section supersedes any conflicting 
provision of this chapter or of a local ordinance. 
Histocy: C. 1953, 41-6-80, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 39; 1987, ch. 138, § 83. 
Compiler's Notes. - Laws 196.9, ch. 111, 
§ 7 repealed former§ 41-6-80 (L, 1941, ch. 52, 
§ 67; C. 1943, 57-7-144; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1), 
relating to driver's duty to exercise due care on 
observing a child, incapacitated person or per-
son with a white cane or guide dog. Present 
§ 41-6-80 was enacted by Laws 1978, ch,. 33, 
§ 39. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
metit substituted "operator" for "driver", de-. 
leted "or any per!'lon propelling a human pow-
ered vehicle" following "avoid colliding with 
any pedestrian" and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation throughout the 
section. 
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41-6-80.1. Operators to yield right-of-way to blind pedes-
trian - Duties of blind pedestrian - Use of cane 
- Failure to yield - Liability. 
(1) (a) The operator of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to any blind or 
visually impaired pedestrian carrying a clearly visible white cane or ac-
companied by a guide dog specially trained for that purpose and equipped 
with a harness. 
(b) A person who fails to yield the right-of-way is liable for any loss or 
damage which results as a proximate cause of failure to yield the right-of-
way to blind or visually impaired persons, except that blind or visually 
impaired persons shall exercise due care in approaching and crossing 
roadways and shall yield right-of-way to emergency vehicles giving an 
audible warning signal. 
(2) A pedestrian other than a blind or visually impaired person may not 
carry a cane as described in Subsection (1). 
History: L. 1969, ch. 111, § 3; 1978, ch. 33, 
§ 25; 1987, ch. 138, § 84. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment designated the previously undesignated 
provisions of Subsection (1); rewrote the provi-
sions of Subsection (l)(a) to the extent that a 
detailed analysis is impracticable; in Subsec-
tion (l)(b) inserted "or visually impaired" fol-
lowing "blind" the first place it appears, substi-
tuted "visually impaired" for "partially blind", 
and substituted "giving an audible warning 
signal" for "sounding a bell, a siren or other 
noise device"; in Subsection (2) substituted 
"visually impaired" for "partially blind, and no 
other"; and made minor changes in phraseol-
ogy and punctuation. 
Cross-References. - Rights and privileges 
of blind and disabled persons,§ 26-30-1 et seq. 
41-6-80.5. Vehicle crossing sidewalk - Operator to yield. 
The operator of a vehicle crossing a sidewalk shall yield the right-of-way to 
any pedestrian and all other traffic on the sidewalk. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-80.5, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
1978, ch. 33, § 40; 1987, ch. 138, § 85. ment substituted "operator" for "driver". 
41-6-81. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Laws 1987, ch. 138, § 106 re-
pealed§ 41-6-81, as enacted by Laws 1941, ch. 
52, § 68, concerning pedestrians using the 
right half of crosswalks. 
41-6-82. Use of roadway by pedestrians - Prohibited ac-
tivities. 
(1) Where there is a sidewalk provided and its use is practicable, a pedes-
trian may not walk along and upon an adjacent roadway. 
(2) Where a sidewalk is· not provided, a pedestrian walking along and upon 
a highway shall walk only on a shoulder, as far as practicable from the edge of 
the roadway. 
(3) Where neither a sidewalk or a shoulder is available, a pedestrian 
walking along or upon a highway shall walk as near as practicable to an 
outside edge of the roadway, and if on a two-way roadway, shall walk only on 
the left side of the roadway. 
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(4) A person may not sit, stand, or loiter in or near a roadway for the 
purpose of soliciting from the occupant of any vehicle a ride, contributions, 
employment, the parking, watching, or guarding of a vehicle, or other busi-
ness. 
(5) A pedestrian who is under the influence of alcohol or any drug to a 
degree which renders him a hazard may not walk or be upon a highway except 
on a sidewalk or sidewalk area. 
(6) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a pedestrian upon a road-
way shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 69; C. 1943, 
57-7-146; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1955, ch. 71, 
§ 1; 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, § 35; 
1978, ch. 33, § 26; 1987, ch. 138, § 86. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (4) inserted "contributions" 
following "soliciting from the occupant of any 
vehicle a ride" and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation throughout the 
section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 389. 
A.L.R. - Admissibility of evidence of habit, 
customary behavior, or reputation as to care of 
pedestrian on question of his care at time of 
collision with motor vehicle giving rise to his 
injury or death, 28 A.L.R.3d 1293. 
Failure to comply with statute regulating 
travel by pedestrian along highway as affect-
ing right to recovery for injuries or death re-
sulting from collision with automobile, 45 
A.L.R.3d 658. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ec> 160(4). 
41-6-82.10. Unmarked crosswalk locations - Restrictions 
on pedestrian. 
The Department of Transportation and local authorities in their respective 
jurisdictions may after an engineering and traffic investigation designate 
unmarked crosswalk locations where pedestrian crossing is prohibited or 
where pedestrians shall yield the right-of-way to vehicles. The restrictions are 
effective only when official traffic-control devices indicating the restrictions 
are in place. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-82.10, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 207, § 36; L. 1979, ch. 242, § 19; 
1987, ch. 138, § 87. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation. 
41-6-82.50. Pedestrian vehicles. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Pedestrian vehicle" means any self-propelled conveyance designed, 
manufactured, and intended for the exclusive use of persons with a physi-
cal disability, but the vehicle may not: 
(i) exceed 48 inches in width; 
(ii) have an engine or motor with more than 300 cubic centimeters 
displacement or with more than 12 brake horsepower; and 
(iii) be capable of developing a speed in excess of 30 miles per hour. 
(b) "Physical disability" means any bodily impairment which precludes 
a person from walking or otherwise moving about as a pedestrian. 
(2) A pedestrian vehicle operated by a physically disabled person is exempt 
from vehicle registration, inspection, and operator license requirements. Au-
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thority to operate a pedestrian vehicle on public highways or sidewalks shall 
be granted according to rules promulgated by the commissioner of public 
safety. 
(3) A physically disabled person may operate a pedestrian vehicle with a 
motor of not more than .5 brake horsepower capable of developing a speed of 
not more than eight miles per hour upon the sidewalk and in all places where 
pedestrians are allowed. No permit, license, registration, authority, applica-
tion, or restriction may be required or imposed upon a physically disabled 
person operating a pedestrian vehicle under this subsection. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-82.50, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 98, § 1. 
ARTICLE 11 
BICYCLES, REGULATION OF OPERATION 
41-6-83. Parents and guardians may not authorize child's 
violation of chapter. 
The parent or guardian of any child may not authorize or knowingly permit 
the child to violate any of the provisions of this chapter. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 70; C. 1943, 
57-7-147; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 88. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment deleted the subsection designation of the 
former Subsection (a); deleted the former Sub-
section (b) regarding the applicability of regu-
lations pertaining to bicycles; and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation in the 
remaining provisions. 
Cross-References. - Dealer licensing of bi-
cycles, § 11-21-1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7 A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 618 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 396. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles Q;,a 162(7). 
41-6-84. Bicycle and moped riders subject to chapter -
Exception. 
Every person operating a bicycle by human power or a moped has all the 
rights, and all the duties and other provisions of this chapter applicable to the 
operator of any other vehicle, except as otherwise specified under this article, 
and except that nonmotorized bicycle operators are not subject to the penalties 
related to operator licenses under alcohol and drug related traffic offenses. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 71; C. 1943, 
57-7-148; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 27; 1986, ch. 36, 
§ 2; 1987, ch. 138, § 89. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amend-
ment substituted "propelling a bicycle by 
human power has all the rights, and is subject 
to the duties and other provisions" for "riding a 
bicycle is subject to the provisions" and "any 
other" for "a" preceding "vehicle"; added a 
comma following "vehicle"; and deleted "can" 
following "nature." 
The 1987 amendment substituted "operat-
ing" for "propelling," "operator" for "driver," 
substituted the present last two exceptions for 
"to those provisions of this chapter which by 
their nature have no application" and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctua-
tion. 
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Cross-References. - Driving on right side 
of highway, exceptions, § 41-6-53. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Child bicycle rider. 
The child bicycle rider must exercise that de-
gree of care which ordinarily would be ob-
served by children of the same age, intelli-
gence, and experience under similar circum-
stances, and whether a child acted negligently 
is a question for the jury to decide according to 
this standard. Donohue v. Rolando, 16 Utah 2d 
294, 400 P.2d 12 (1965). 
41-6-85. Carrying more persons than design permits pro-
hibited - Exception. 
A bicycle or moped may not be used to carry more persons at one time than 
the number for which it is designed or equipped, except that an adult rider 
may carry a child securely attached to his person in a back pack or sling. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 72; C. 1943, 
57-7-149; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 37; 1978, ch. 33, 
§ 28; 1987, ch. 138, § 90. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment deleted Subsection (1), relating to seats 
on bicycles; deleted the Subsection (2) designa-
tion; inserted "or moped" following "bicycle"; 
and made a minor change in phraseology. 
41-6-86. Persons on bicycles, mopeds, skates, and sleds 
not to attach to moving vehicles - Exception. 
(1) A person riding a bicycle, moped, coaster, skate board, roller skates, 
sled, or toy vehicle may not attach it or himself to any moving vehicle upon a 
highway. 
(2) This section does not prohibit attaching a trailer or semitrailer to a 
bicycle or moped if that trailer or semitrailer has been designed for attach-
ment. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 73; C. 1943, 
57-7-150; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 29; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 91. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (1) substituted "moped, 
coaster, skate board" for "coaster" following 
"bicycle," and substituted "highway" for "road-
way"; in Subsection (2) inserted "or moped" fol-
lowing "bicycle"; and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation. 
41-6-87. Operation of bicycle or moped on and use of road-
way - Duties, prohibitions. 
(1) A person operating a bicycle or a moped upon a roadway at less than the 
normal speed of traffic at the time and place and under the conditions then 
existing shall ride as near as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the 
roadway except: 
(a) when overtaking and passing another bicycle or vehicle proceeding 
in the same direction; 
(b) when preparing to make a left turn at an intersection or into a 
private road or driveway; or 
(c) when reasonably necessary to avoid conditions including, but not 
limited to, fixed or moving objects, parked or moving vehicles, bicycles, 
pedestrians, animals, surface hazards, or substandard width lanes that 
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make it unsafe to continue along the right-hand curb or edge. In this 
subsection, "substandard width lane" means a lane that is too narrow for 
a bicycle and a vehicle to travel safely side by side within the lane. 
(2) Persons riding bicycles or mopeds upon a roadway may not ride more 
than two abreast except on paths or parts of roadways set aside for the exclu-
sive use of bicycles. Persons riding two abreast may not impede the normal 
and reasonable movement of traffic and, on a laned roadway, shall ride within 
a single lane. 
(3) Where a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a road-
way, bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 74; C. 1943, 
57-7-151; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1978, ch. 33, 
§ 30; 1987, ch. 138, § 92. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment rewrote the provisions of Subsection (1) 
to the extent that a detailed analysis is imprac-
ticable; added the present Subsections (l)(a) 
through (c); in Subsection (2) inserted "or mo-
peds" following "bicycles" in the first place it 
appears; and made minor changes in phraseol-
ogy and punctuation throughout the section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Contributory negligence. 
The rule in this jurisdiction that a law viola-
tion is negligence as a matter of law does not 
overcome the rule that the contributory negli-
gence of a child is to be determined according 
to the proper standard of care with which he is 
charged. It does not mean that the statutory 
violation rule is nullified where children are 
involved. If the violation of a statute by a child 
is found to evidence less care than that which 
ordinarily could be expected of a child of the 
same age, intelligence, knowledge, and experi-
ence, he could be held contributorily negligent 
barring his recovery by a jury as a question of 
fact about which there might be reasonable dif-
ference of opinion. Morby v. Rogers, 122 Utah 
540, 252 P.2d 231 (1953). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 620. 
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 396. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ~ 162(7). 
41-6-87.3. Bicycles to yield right-of-way to pedestrians on 
sidewalk - Where use of sidewalk prohibited -
Same laws as for pedestrians. 
(1) A person operating a bicycle upon and along a sidewalk, or across a 
roadway upon and along a crosswalk, shall yield the right-of-way to any 
pedestrian and shall give audible signal before overtaking and passing a 
pedestrian. 
(2) A person may not operate a bicycle upon and along a sidewalk, or across 
a roadway upon and along a crosswalk, where use of bicycles is prohibited by 
official traffic-control devices. 
(3) A person operating a vehicle by human power upon and along a side-
walk, or across a roadway upon and along a crosswalk, has all the rights and 
duties applicable to a pedestrian under the same circumstances. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.3, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 41; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 93. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operating" for "propelling" 
in Subsections (1) and (3), substituted "oper-
ate" for "ride" in Subsection (2) and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctua-
tion. 
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41-6-87.4. Bicycles - Parking on sidewalk, roadway -
Prohibitions. 
(1) A person may park a bicycle on a sidewalk unless prohibited or re-
stricted by an official traffic-control device. 
(2) A bicycle parked on a sidewalk may not impede the normal and reason-
able movement of pedestrian or other traffic. 
(3) A bicycle may be parked on the roadway at any angle to the curb or edge 
of the roadway at any location where parking is allowed. 
(4) A bicycle may be parked on the roadway abreast of another bicycle or 
bicycles near the side of the roadway at any location where parking is al-
lowed. 
(5) A bicycle may not be parked on a roadway in a manner as to obstruct 
the movement of a legally parked motor vehicle. 
(6) In all other respects, bicycles parked anywhere on a highway shall con-
form with the provisions of Article 14 of this chapter, regarding the parking of 
vehicles. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.4, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 42; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 94. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (6) inserted "of this chap-
ter" following "Article 14" and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
41-6-87.5. Bicycles and mopeds - Turns - Designated 
lanes. 
(1) A person riding a bicycle or moped and intending to turn left shall 
comply with Section 41-6-66 or Subsection (2). 
(2) A person riding a bicycle or moped intending to turn left shall approach 
the turn as close as practicable to the right curb or edge of the roadway. After 
proceeding across the intersecting roadway, to the far corner of the curb or 
intersection of the roadway edges, the bicyclist or moped operator shall stop, 
as far out of the way of traffic as practical. After stopping he shall yield to any 
traffic proceeding in either direction along the roadway he had been using. 
After yielding and complying with any official traffic-control device or peace 
officer regulating traffic, he may proceed in the new direction. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsections (1) and (2), the Department of Transporta-
tion and local authorities in their respective jurisdictions may cause official 
traffic-control devices to be placed and require and direct that a specific course 
be traveled by turning bicycles and mopeds. When the devices are placed, a 
person may not turn a bicycle other than as directed by the devices. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.5, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 43; 1987, ch. 138, § 95. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment inserted "moped" following "bicycle" 
where it appears in the first sentence of Sub-
section (1) and in the first sentence of Subsec-
tions (2) and (3); in Subsection (2) rewrote the 
second sentence; inserted the present third 
sentence; in the present fourth sentence substi-
tuted "peace officer" for "police officer"; and 
made minor changes in phraseology and punc-
tuation throughout the section. 
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41-6-87.7. Bicycles and mopeds - Turn signals. 
(1) Except as provided in this section, a person riding a bicycle or moped 
shall comply with Section 41-6-69. 
(2) A signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be given 
continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the bicycle or 
moped before turning, and shall be given while the bicycle or moped is stopped 
waiting to turn. A signal by hand and arm need not be given continuously if 
the hand is needed in the control or operation of the bicycle or moped. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.7, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 44; 1987, ch. 138, § 96. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment inserted "or moped" following "bicycle" 
each place it appears. 
41-6-87.8. Bicycle and moped inspections - At request of 
officer. 
A peace officer may at any time upon reasonable cause to believe that a 
bicycle or moped is unsafe or not equipped as required by law, or that its 
equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair, require the person riding the 
bicycle or moped to stop and submit the bicycle or moped to an inspection and 
a test as appropriate. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.8, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 45; 1987, ch. 138, § 97. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment inserted "or moped" following "bicycle" 
each place it appears and made minor changes 
in phraseology and punctuation. 
41-6-87.9. Bicycle racing - When approved - Prohibi-
tions - Exceptions - Authorized exemptions 
from traffic laws. 
(1) Bicycle racing on highways is prohibited under Section 41-6-51, except 
as authorized in this section. 
(2) Bicycle racing on a highway is permitted when a racing event is ap-
proved by state or local authorities on any highway under their respective 
jurisdictions. Approval of bicycle highway racing events may be granted only 
under conditions which assure reasonable safety for all race participants, 
spectators, and other highway users, and which prevent unreasonable inter-
ference with traffic flow which would seriously inconvenience other highway 
users. 
(3) By agreement with the approving authority, participants in an ap-
proved bicycle highway racing event may be exempted from compliance with 
any traffic laws otherwise applicable, if traffic control is adequate to assure 
the safety of all highway users. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.9, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 46; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 98. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation. 
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41-6-88. Bicycles and mopeds - Carrying bundle - One 
hand on handlebars. 
A person operating a bicycle or moped may not carry any package, bundle, 
or article which prevents the use of both hands in the control and operation of 
the bicycle or moped. A person operating a bicycle or moped shall keep at least 
one hand on the handlebars at all times. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 75; C. 1943, 
57-7-152; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 38; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 99. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment rewrote the provisions of this section to 
the extent that a detailed analysis is impracti-
cable. 
41-6-89. Bicycle - Prohibited equipment - Brakes re-
quired. 
(1) A bicycle may not be equipped with, and a person may not use upon a 
bicycle, any siren or whistle. 
(2) Every bicycle shall be equipped with a brake or brakes which enable its 
driver to stop the bicycle within 25 feet from a speed of 10 miles per hour on 
dry, level, clean pavement. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 76; C. 1943, 
57-7-153; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1978, ch. 33, 
§ 31; 1987, ch. 138, § 100. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation. 
41-6-90. Bicycles - Lamps and reflective material re-
quired. 
(1) Every bicycle in use at the times described in Section 41-6-118 shall be 
equipped with a lamp on the front emitting a white light visible from a dis-
tance of at least 500 feet to the front and with a red reflector of a type ap-
proved by the department which is visible for 500 feet to the rear when di-
rectly in front of lawful lower beams of head lamps on a motor vehicle. 
(2) Every bicycle when in use at the times described in Section 41-6-118 
shall be equipped with reflective material of sufficient size and reflectivity to 
be visible from both sides for 500 feet when directly in front of lawful lower 
beams of head lamps on a motor vehicle, or in lieu of reflective material, with 
a lighted lamp visible from both sides from a distance of at least 500 feet. 
(3) A bicycle or its rider may be equipped with lights or reflectors in addi-
tion to those required by Subsections (1) and (2). 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-90, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 50; 1987, ch. 138, § 101. 
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1978, 
ch. 33, § 50 repealed former § 41-6-90 (L. 
1941, ch. 52, § 77; C. 1943, 57-7-154; L. 1955, 
ch. 71, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, § 39), relating to 
lights and reflectors on bicycles operated at 
night, and enacted present § 41-6-90. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
41-6-95 
Violation as negligence. 
Riding of bicycle in dark without a lamp was 
violation of this statute and thus established 
some negligence as a matter of law. Whether 
the absence of the lamp was the contributing 
proximate cause of the collision between bicy-
cle and taxicab was jury question. Gibbs v. 
Blue Cab, 122 Utah 312, 249 P.2d 213 (1952). 
ARTICLE 12 
RAILROAD TRAINS AND SAFETY ZONES 
41-6-91, 41-6-92. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Sections 41-6-91, 41-6-92 (L. 57-7-156), relating to passing railroad trains, 
1941, ch. 52, §§ 78, 79; C. 1943, 57-7-155, were repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 242, § 74. 
41-6-93. Driving on tracks. 
(a) It is unlawful for the driver of any vehicle proceeding upon any track in 
front of a railroad train upon a street to fail to remove such vehicle from the 
track as soon as practicable after signal from the operator of such train. 
(b) When a railroad train has started to cross an intersection no driver of a 
vehicle shall drive upon or cross the tracks or in the path of such train within 
the intersection in front of such train. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 80; C. 1943, 
57-7-157. 
41-6-94. Driving through safety zone. 
No vehicle shall at any time be driven through or within a safety zone. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 81; C. 1943, 
57-7-158. 
ARTICLE 13 
SPECIAL STOPS REQUIRED 
41-6-95. Railroad grade crossing - Duty to stop - Driving 
through, around or under gate or barrier prohib-
ited. 
(a) Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade 
crossing, the driver of such vehicle shall stop within fifty feet but not less than 
ten feet from the nearest track of such railroad and shall not proceed until he 
can do so safely when: 
(1) A clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device gives warning 
of the immediate approach of a train. 
(2) A crossing gate is lowered, or when a human flagman gives or 
continues to give a signal of the approach or passage of a train. 
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